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I. INTRODUCTION
In September 1995, a California federal district court ruled in
Colello v. SEC' that the use by the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) of a mutual legal assistance treaty with Switzerland to
freeze the Swiss bank accounts of individuals suspected of securities
fraud under the jurisdiction of the SEC violated the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. This ruling not only draws
into question the constitutionality of the particular action taken by
the SEC in this case, but also the constitutionality in general of the
use of treaties and less formal agreements by the SEC to obtain in-
formation and asset freezes.
This Note will first provide a brief background on the main in-
ternational assistance mechanisms used by the SEC as well as some
of the drawbacks to each mechanism. The Colello case will then be
presented and briefly analyzed. Finally, several recent agreements
used by the SEC in international investigation and enforcement will
be examined, in light both of the issues raised in Colello and other is-
sues.
II. INTERNATIONAL INVESTIGATION AND
ENFORCEMENT METHODS
A. Traditional Methods: The Hague Convention on the Taking of
Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters
Though not directly relevant to the issues considered in Colello,
the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or
1. 908 F. Supp. 738; Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 7 99,424 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
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Commercial Matters2 merits a brief mention, as it was the first con-
crete agreement through which member states could request assis-
tance from each other to obtain evidence "for use in judicial pro-
ceedings, commenced or contemplated. 3  Under the Hague
Convention, Letters of Request may be sent to the designated
authority in a member state, and, to the extent that the request is
compatible with that state's domestic law, the request is to be exe-
cuted expediently.4 Though an important step towards fostering in-
ternational cooperation in obtaining evidence for use in domestic
proceedings, its value to the SEC has been limited by the fact that it
applies only to civil judicial proceedings, and is thus inapplicable to
the SEC's administrative actions and requests.5 A further restriction
is found in Article 23 of the Hague Convention, which allows signato-
ries to declare that they will not execute letters rogatory for
"discovery" as it is known in common law countries.! However, Arti-
cle 27 provides that information-gathering methods not listed in the
convention are permissible as well.8 Thus, courts need not turn to the
Hague Convention in order to obtain information; rather, they can
employ other means, such as their subpoena powers over United
States-based branches of foreign entities.9
B. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) are bilateral treaties
2. Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Mat-
ters, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 241[hereinafter Hague
Convention].
3. Id. art. 1, para. 2,23 U.S.T. at 2557,847 U.N.T.S. at 241.
4. See id. art. 12, para. (a), 23 U.S.T. at 2562,847 U.N.T.S. at 243.
5. See id.; Caroline Greene, Note, International Securities Law Enforcement: Recent Ad.
vances in Assistance, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 635, 639-40; Richard M. Phillips et al., The
Internationalization of Securities Fraud Enforcement in the 1990's, in 2 TWENTY-THIRD
ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 383,384 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 755,1991).
6. A letter rogatory is a formal request for evidence by a court in one jurisdiction to a
court in the jurisdiction in which the evidence is located. See Greene, supra note 5, at 639.
This method is cumbersome, and leads to inconsistent results, as the court receiving the letter
rogatory is under no obligation to execute the request and may deny it without stating reasons.
See Robert G. Morvillo, International Criminal Law Issues, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 1,1994, at 3, 6.
7. Hague Convention, supra note 2, art. 23,23 U.S.T. at 2568,847 U.N.T.S. at 245.
& Id. art. 27,23 U.S.T. at 2569,847 U.N.T.S. at 246.
9. See, eg., Societ6 Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Ct. for the
S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 544 (1987) (ruling that comity does not require resort to the
Hague Convention before using other discovery methods, particularly when the corporation
ordered to comply with discovery order was within the court's jurisdiction).
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that are designed to aid in cross-border mutual enforcement and as-
sistance in the investigation and prosecution of criminal violations."0
They are negotiated through diplomatic channels1 and, like any other
treaty, must be ratified by the U.S. Senate.' Under an MLAT, re-
quests for assistance pass directly between the "designated authori-
ties" of the countries involved.' Unlike the procedures used under
the Hague Convention, these "designated parties" are separate from
the judiciary,14 which alleviates the problem under the Hague Con-
vention of states refusing to provide information to non-judicial
authorities.
MLATs provide for several different kinds of assistance. Gen-
erally, a party to the treaty may request asset freezes,15 forfeiture ac-
tions, repatriation of assets located abroad, and enforcement of for-
feiture judgments issued by a court of the requesting country. 6
However, there are several restrictions on the effectiveness of
MLATs, the most important of which is the widespread use of a dual
criminality requirement." Under the dual criminality requirement,
the offense being investigated must be a criminal violation in both
10. See Philip Erwin, Comment, The International Securities Enforcement Cooperation Act
of 1990: Increasing International Cooperation in Extraterritorial Discovery?, 15 B.C. INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 471,482 (1992).
11. See Greene, supra note 5, at 640.
12. See James A. Kehoe, Comment, Exporting Insider Trading Laws: The Enforcement of
U.S. Insider Trading Laws Internationally, 9 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 345,362 (1995).
13. See Robert L. Pisani & Robert Fogelnest, The United States Treaties on Mutual Assis-
tance in Criminal Matters, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: A GUIDE TO U.S. PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE 233,236 (Ved P. Nanda & M. Cherif Bassouni eds., 1987).
14. The "designated parties" are frequently prosecutorial agencies. See, e.g., Treaty on
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973, U.S.-Switz., 27 U.S.T. 2019, 2050
(entered into force Jan. 23, 1977) [hereinafter Swiss Treaty]. The "designated authority" for
the United States is the Attorney General or his/her appointee, and the "designated authority"
for Switzerland is the Division of Police of the Federal Department of Justice and Police. Id.,
para. 1, 27 U.S.T. at 2050.
15. But see Colello v. SEC, 908 F. Supp. 738,749-52 (C.D. Calif. 1995) (holding that since
Swiss MLAT does not specifically provide for asset freezes, the use of such freezes is of ques-
tionable validity absent other formal agreements). For further discussion of asset freezes, see
infra Part III.
16. See Michael Mann et al., The Establishment of International Mechanisms for Enforcing
Provisional Orders and Final Judgments Arising from Securities Law Violations, 55 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 303, 323 (1992) [hereinafter Establishment of International Enforcement
Mechanisms].
17. See, e..g., Swiss Treaty, supra note 14, art. 4, 27 U.S.T. at 2028-29. In the last few years,
MLATs have been signed that significantly expand the scope of assistance permitted, including
the removal of the dual criminality requirement As these are still awaiting ratification, I will
discuss them in the section on current developments, infra Part V.
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the requesting state and the executing state.18 Thus, where an action
is illegal in the United States, but not in the requested country, as was
recently still the case with insider trading in Switzerland,19 no assis-
tance as to the investigation of that action may be obtained under an
MLAT.
The effectiveness of MLATs is also limited by the fact that re-
quests for assistance must go through the "designated parties." Since
all requests must be approved and transmitted by the Department of
Justice, the SEC is effectively deprived of the ultimate power to de-
cide whether to request information." Furthermore, Article 3 of the
Swiss Treaty allows the executing country to deny assistance if such
assistance would "prejudice [its] sovereignty, security, or other simi-
lar interests., 21 In addition, under Article 5 of the Swiss Treaty, in-
formation obtained by means of the treaty may only be used, with
limited exceptions, in proceedings relating to the offense for which
assistance has been granted.'
C. Memoranda of Understanding
Where an MLAT is either nonexistent or its use is impractical,
the SEC may turn to another alternative: the Memorandum of Un-
derstanding (hereinafter MOU). In the context of international se-
curities law enforcement, MOUs are non-binding statements of in-
tent between regulators in different countries that are designed to
facilitate the exchange of information and mutual cooperation in the
investigation of securities violations.' MOUs provide many advan-
18. See, e.g., id.; Kehoe, supra note 12, at 364; Michael D. Mann & Lise A. Lustgarten,
Internationalization of Insider Trading Enforcement-A Guide to Regulation and Cooperation,
in WHrrE COLLAR CRimE 511, 530 (ABA National Institute on White Collar Crime, 1990)
[hereinafter Mann & Lustgarten].
19. See discussion of Memoranda of Understanding [hereinafter MOUs], infra Part IIC.
20. See Kehoe, supra note 12, at 363.
21. Swiss Treaty, supra note 14, art. 3, 27 U.S.T. at 2028. It appears, however, that assis-
tance is generally granted as long as the person about whom information is sought is connected
with the offense. See Mann & Lustgarten, supra note 18, at 530-31.
22. See Swiss Treaty, supra note 14, art. 5(1), 27 U.S.T. at 2029. This means that the evi-
dence can only be used in the investigation and prosecution of a person who was being investi-
gated for the specific offense for which assistance was granted. The main exception is that the
information may also be used in the investigation or prosecution of a person who was a suspect
in an investigation for which assistance has been granted and who is suspected of another of-
fense for which assistance is required to be (but has not yet been) granted under the Treaty. Id.
art. 5(2), 27 U.S.T. at 2030.
23. See, e.g., Ronald E. Bornstein & N. Elaine Dugger, International Regulation of Insider
Trading, 2 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 375,414 (1987).
24. See Mann & Lustgarten, supra note 18, at 534. For a general description of MOUs, see
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tages over MLATs. Unlike MLATs, MOUs are negotiated, and their
terms are carried out, directly between securities regulators in vari-
ous countries, rather than through "designated parties." This feature
leads to greater speed and reliability of requests and assistance, as
there is no need to pass through "designated parties." MOUs pro-
vide a more expeditious means for establishing mutual assistance
mechanisms, as they do not require Senate ratification.' Further-
more, MOUs do not have the dual criminality requirement of the
MLATsO Finally, since MOUs are subject-specific, they are better
able to address specific concerns in international securities regula-
tion; in contrast, the Hague Convention and MLATs are general
agreements applicable in many other contexts, and are thus often
overbroad and not sufficiently detailed in the context of securities
regulation.
The SEC's first MOU was with Switzerland in 1982.27 This MOU
provided for assistance to the SEC in insider trading investigations,
but only when assistance under the Swiss MLAT was infeasibleY8
Under the treaty, requests for information are processed through the
Swiss Central Authority, and information divulged may only be used
in SEC or Department of Justice proceedings "relating to trading by
persons in possession of material non-public information." '29 Before
releasing information on suspected insider traders, Swiss banks in-
form those customers of the request and provide them with a chance
to refute the charges.0
Kehoe, supra note 12, at 359-62.
25. See Greene, supra note 5, at 649.
26. See Michael D. Mann & Joseph G. Mari, Developments in International Securities
Law Enforcement and Regulation 34 (Oct. 24, 1990) (SEC Securities Regulation Seminar
Document, unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Journal of Comparative & Interna-
tional Law), at 74-86.
27. Memorandum of Understanding to Establish Mutually Acceptable Means for Im-
proving International Law Enforcement Cooperation in the Field of Insider Trading, Aug. 31,
1982, U.S.-Switz., 22 I.L.M. 1 [hereinafter First Swiss MOU].
28. See id., art. III, para. 3, at 3. The obvious case of infeasibility is one in which the activ-
ity being investigated or prosecuted is a crime in one country, but not the other. Since insider
trading was not illegal per se in Switzerland at the time, the MLAT could not be used, so the
MOU was developed to fill the gap. Tippee trading, on the other hand, was illegal in Switzer-
land, and assistance in its prosecution could therefore be requested under the Swiss Treaty.
Switzerland: Supreme Court Opinion in the Second Santa Fe Case Concerning Judicial Assis-
tance, 24 I.L.M. 745,746-47 (1985).
29. First Swiss MOU, supra note 27, art. III, para. 3,22 I.L.M. at 4.
30. The MOU incorporated Convention XVI, a private agreement between Swiss bankers.
Convention XVI authorized the release of information about bank customers if certain criteria
indicating insider trading on the U.S. markets were met, and if customers had been given notice
and a chance to explain their trading activity. If the customer failed to provide an adequate
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Over the course of the 1980s, similar MOUs were concluded be-
tween the SEC and its regulatory counterparts in Japan31 and the
United Kingdom,3 2 both of which were relatively limited in scope.3
In the late 1980s, as greater flexibility was being encouraged in inter-
national securities law enforcement agreements, the SEC began to
enter into a "new type"'35 of MOU, beginning with its counterparts in
Canada36 and Brazil.3 7 This new type of MOU greatly broadens the
scope of assistance that can be sought. For example, the Canadian
MOU calls for the "fullest mutual assistance possible" where one
agency needs information that is in the jurisdiction of another,38 and
covers virtually all SEC investigations of securities violations, in-
cluding compulsory subpoena powers and the authority of one party
to launch a "full scale investigation" at the behest of the other party. 9
Since the passage of the Insider Trading & Securities Enforcement
Act (ITSFEA) and the International Securities Cooperation Act
(ISECA), ° the number of MOUs has grown rapidly41 with most fol-
explanation, the convention authorized the bank to freeze the customer's account. See Greene,
supra note 5, at 651.
31. Memorandum of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and the Securities Bu-
reau of the Japanese Ministry of Finance on the Sharing of Information, May 23, 1986, 43 SEC
Docket 184, reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 1429.
32. Memorandum of Understanding on Exchange of Information in Matters Relating to
Securities and Futures, Sept. 23,1986, U.S.-U.K., 25 I.L.M. 1431.
33. See Pamela Jimenez, Comment, International Securities Enforcement Cooperation Act
and Memoranda of Understanding, 31 HARV. INT'L L.J. 295, 306-08 (1990) (noting that the
U.K. MOU provides only for "best efforts" to provide records and that the Japanese MOU
calls for cooperation on a "case-by-case basis").
34. It was during this period that the legislation that was to become ITSFEA and ISECA,
see discussion, infra Part II D, was being introduced and debated in Congress.
35. Greene, supra note 5, at 654.
36. Memorandum of Understanding on Administration and Enforcement of Securities
Laws, Jan. 7,1988, U.S.-Can., 27 I.L.M. 410 [hereinafter Canadian MOU].
37. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Securities Exchange Commission and
the Brazil Commissao De Valores Mobiliarios, July 1, 1988, U.S.-Braz., 43 SEC Docket 196
[hereinafter Brazilian MOU].
38. Joint Press Release, U.S. and Canadian Provincial Securities Regulators Sign Memo-
randum of Understanding to Enhance Cooperation in Enforcement, 11 OSC Bull., No. 1, Jan. 8,
1988, cited in Jimenez, supra note 33, at 308 n.84.
39. Canadian MOU, supra note 36, art. 1, 27 I.L.M. at 410-13. For a more complete sum-
mary of the features of the Canadian MOU, see Greene, supra note 5, at 654-55.
40. See discussion infra Part II.D.
41. See The Securities and Exchange Commission Reauthorization Act of 1996. Hearings
on H.R. 2972 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Comm.
on Commerce, 104th Cong., 203-35 (1996) (testimony of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC) (In the
last several years, MOUs have been entered into with 27 countries; in 1995 alone, the SEC
made 230 requests for enforcement assistance from foreign governments under MOUs or other
less formal arrangements); see also Michael D. Mann & Lise A. Lustgarten, Internationaliza-
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lowing the same pattern as the Canadian and Brazilian MOUs. For
example, the MOU with Norway provides for "the fullest mutual as-
sistance.., to facilitate the enforcement of [securities] laws or regu-
lations;... and the conduct of investigations, litigation, or prosecu-
tion... without regard to whether the type of conduct described..
. would constitute a violation of the laws.., of the requested author-
ity. '42 The recent MOU with Hong Kong defines an almost identical
scope of assistance.4 Unlike the earlier MOUs, these recent MOUs
explicitly provide for cooperation in enforcement actions as well as in
investigatory proceedings.
D. ITSFEA and ISECA
In light of the general "best efforts" limitations to MOUs in the
early 1980s,4 and the limitations inherent in MLATs,5 it was natural
that the SEC would push for domestic enabling legislation to
strengthen international assistance agreements. This was accom-
plished by the passage of two acts: the Insider Trading and Securities
Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988' (ITSFEA) and the International
Securities Cooperation Act of 1990' (ISECA).
Primarily, ITSFEA gives the SEC the power to investigate secu-
tion of Insider Trading Enforcement" A Guide to Regulation and Cooperation, 798 PLI/CORP. 7,
in Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series, January 14-15, 1993 (MOUs have
been entered into with Brazil (1988), Italy (1989), the Netherlands (1989), France (1989), Hun-
gary (1990), Mexico (1990), Norway (1991), Argentina (1991), Spain (1992), the European
Community (1991), Sweden (1991), Costa Rica (1991), Indonesia (1992)). More recently, the
SEC has announced that MOUs have been entered into with China, SEC 94-35, 1994 WL
150804 (Apr. 28,1994); Hong Kong, SEC 95-215, 1995 WL 582726 (Oct. 5, 1995); Russia, SEC
95-252,1995 WL 717669 (Dec. 7, 1995); Egypt, SEC 96-23,1996 WL 58439 (Feb. 11, 1996); and
Israel, SEC 96-26,1994 WL 57014 (Feb. 13,1996).
42. Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission and the Norway Banking, Insurance, and Securities Commission Concerning Con-
sultation and Cooperation in the Administration and Enforcement of Securities Laws, Sep-
tember 24, 1991, art. 3(1), SEC Int'l Series, Release No. 321, available in 1991 SEC Lexis 1995
[hereinafter Norwegian MOU].
43. Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission and the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission Concerning Consultation
and Cooperation in the Administration and Enforcement of Securities Laws, October 5, 1995,
art. 3.1,1995 SEC Lexis 2810 [hereinafter Hong Kong MOU].
44. See, e.g., Jimenez, supra note 33, at 307.
45. See supra text accompanying notes 9-21.
46. Insider Trading & Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704,102
Stat. 4677 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (1988 & Supp. V 1993))
[hereinafter ITSFEA].
47. International Securities Cooperation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-550, 104 Stat. 2714
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (1988 & Supp. V 1993)) [hereinafter
ISECA].
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rities law violations on behalf of foreign securities authorities even if
no "dual criminality" is present; in other words, the action being in-
vestigated need only be a violation of law in the country requesting
investigative assistance, and need not be a violation of U.S. law.48
This impetus was carried forward by the passage in 1990 of the
ISECA, which gives the SEC greater leverage in negotiating
"forceful and binding international enforcement cooperation agree-
ments, a strategy that the SEC has been pursuing since the mid-
1980s." 4 The ISECA contains four particularly important provisions.
First, it grants an exemption to the Freedom- of Information Act.5°
When a foreign securities regulator has provided the SEC with confi-
dential information, the SEC may withhold disclosure of such infor-
mation where the foreign regulator has made a good faith showing
that disclosure would be illegal under the foreign country's laws, even
where disclosure would normally be mandated under the FOIA."
Congress' goal in passing this provision was to encourage foreign
regulators to enter into binding agreements with the SEC without
fear that information that was confidential in the foreign country
would be revealed in the United States.52
The second major provision of the ISECA addresses FOIA re-
strictions on the disclosure of confidential information. 3 The ISECA
gives the SEC general rulemaking authority to provide records to
domestic and foreign persons, as long as those persons provide
"adequate assurances of confidentiality,"'' and the records are fur-
nished only for the purposes given in the request.5 The result is
likely to be greater willingness on the part of foreign authorities to
negotiate agreements with more specific provisions on access to in-
formation.56
48. ITSFEA, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a)(2).
49. Kehoe, supra note 12, at 370. For a more thorough description of the ISECA's provi-
sions, see Erwin, supra note 10, at 488-99.
50. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (198.8) [hereinafter FOIA].
51. See ISECA, 15 U.S.C. § 78x(d).
52. See Erwin, supra note 10, at 491-92.
53. See id. at 492. Under the Securities Enforcement Act as amended in 1975, the SEC
was prevented from disclosing information deemed confidential under the FOIA.
54. ISECA, 15 U.S.C. § 78x(c).
55. See H.R. REP. No. 101-240, at 20-23 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3888,
3914. The specific limitations on the use of information provided is generally set out in the
MOU. By virtue of this power, the SEC is able to release to foreign securities regulators in-
formation that might otherwise be protected from disclosure under FOIA.
56. For example, the Canadian MOU provides for the use of all reasonable efforts to ob-
tain the necessary authorization to fulfill requests under the MOU. Canadian MOU, supra
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The third major provision of the ISECA is the SEC's authority
to discipline U.S.-registered securities professionals based on findings
of a foreign court.' By virtue of this authority, the SEC will now be
able to offer agreements encompassing such enforcement actions in
the United States in return for similar enforcement actions in foreign
countries,5 s thus broadening the range of instruments available for the
international enforcement of securities laws.
The fourth major provision of the ISECA for the first time ex-
plicitly allows the SEC to request reimbursement from foreign securi-
ties authorities for expenses incurred in carrying out requests for
those foreign authorities.59 In implementing this provision, Congress
sought to expand the SEC's enforcement capabilities by increasing
the economic feasibility of investigations at the request of foreign se-
curities authorities."
III. COLELLO AND OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
A. The Colello Case
In June 1994 the SEC sued Michael Colello for his role in a
pyramid scheme.61 Before filing the enforcement action against Co-
lello and other defendants, the SEC sent a request under the Swiss
Treaty, via the Department of Justice, to freeze Colello's Swiss bank
accounts in order to prevent further dissipation of the funds con-
tained in those accounts once the enforcement action was an-
nounced. 2 Though the Swiss Treaty makes no explicit mention of as-
set freezes, the Swiss enabling legislation for the treaty specifically
permits asset freezes, and the American request for an asset freeze
indicates that both parties believe that asset freezes are a permissible
measure under the Treaty.' Colello received no notice from the SEC
note 36, at 414. The SEC's increased authority under ISECA now gives considerably more
muscle to this provision, as the SEC now has substantial power to determine on its own what
information may be released to the Canadian authorities.
57. See Erwin, supra note 10, at 495.
58. See, e.g., Kehoe, supra note 12, at 373.
59. See ISECA, 15 U.S.C. § 78d. The Canadian MOU provides for cost-sharing between
the requesting and the requested authority. Canadian MOU, supra note 36, at 420. ISECA
now gives the SEC legal authority to fully use this provision in the Canadian MOU.
60. See Erwin, supra note 10, at 495-96.
61. Colello v. SEC, 908 F. Supp. 738, 740 (C.D. Cal. 1995). A pyramid scheme is a sales
device "in which a buyer of goods is promised a payment for each additional buyer procured by
him." BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 1237 (6th ed. 1990).
62. Colello, 908 F. Supp. at 741-42.
63. Barr v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 819 F.2d 25,28 (2nd Cir. 1987). The SEC used the Swiss
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that his Swiss accounts were being frozen, either prior to or following
the freeze. However, the Swiss, in accordance with Swiss enabling
legislation associated with the treaty, notified Colello and provided
him with the chance to file a written objection.' At the same time
the Swiss assets were frozen, a temporary restraining order was is-
sued in the United States, freezing all the defendants' assets, includ-
ing Colello's.6s This domestic temporary restraining order and asset
freeze dissolved, however, when the court declined to grant the
SEC's motion for a preliminary injunction.6 Colello then asked the
court to require the SEC to ask the Swiss to dissolve the freeze on the
Swiss accounts. The court denied the motion, agreeing with the SEC
that the court had not ordered the freeze, and the freeze had not
been part of the enforcement action. 7 Colello then petitioned the
Swiss Central Authority to have the freeze lifted, which the Swiss
Central Authority denied, though it requested an explanation from
the SEC as to why the freeze should remain in effect.' The Depart-
ment of Justice responded that the domestic ruling was only prelimi-
nary, that Colello remained a defendant in the case, and that addi-
tional information was being gathered linking Colello to the
fraudulent scheme.69 The Swiss Federal Supreme Court held that the
asset freeze was proper, explaining that the Swiss courts could not
rule on alleged deficiencies in the American proceedings, and that its
scope of review was limited to whether the preconditions for assis-
tance under the treaty had been met." Finally, the American court
found that there was "no genuine issue of material fact as to Colello's
improper receipt of investors' funds and that, as a matter of law, dis-
gorgement [was] appropriate, indeed, necessary."7
Colello filed suit against the SEC, claiming that the asset freeze
under the Swiss Treaty had violated his Fourth Amendment right
against unreasonable search and seizure, as well as his Fifth Amend-
Treaty to freeze Barr's Swiss assets after Barr had been indicted on charges of conspiracy,
fraud, and grand larceny. The court held that, absent a showing by Barr that the interpretation
of the Swiss Treaty to include asset freezes was wrong, deference would be given to that inter-
pretation. Id.
64. See Colello, 908 F. Supp. at 746.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See id. at 743.
69. See id.
70. See id. at 743-44.
71. See id. at 744.
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ment procedural due process right to notice and a hearing.7 The
court granted summary judgment for Colello on both counts.3
The court held that the Fourth Amendment requirement of
probable cause had been violated because the "reasonable suspicion"
standard required for a request under the treaty was less than the
requisite standard of probable cause.74 In fact, the Technical Analysis
of the Treaty specifically explained that "reasonable suspicion" was
to be a less stringent standard than "probable cause" so that sus-
pected offenses could be verified.'
As to the due process claim, the court applied the test an-
nounced in Fuentes v. Shevin.7 Under this test, before a seizure may
be executed without a predeprivation hearing, three criteria must be
satisfied: (1) the seizure must be directly necessary to secure an im-
portant governmental or general public interest; (2) there has to be a
special need for prompt action; and (3) the State must keep strict
control over its monopoly of legitimate force, i.e., "the person initi-
ating the seizure has been a government official responsible for de-
termining, under the standards of a narrowly drawn statute, that it
was necessary and justified in the particular instance."' The court
found that the first two requirements were satisfied by the important
public interest in preventing securities fraud and the need for prompt
action to avoid the dissipation of Colello's ill-begotten assets. The
court held, however, that the third requirement was not met, as there
was no statute in force that addressed the issue, no mention of asset
freezes in the Treaty, and no other source of "tight standards" to con-
trol the SEC's discretion. Furthermore, the court noted that Colelio
had not been provided with either pre- or post-deprivation notice and
opportunity for a hearing by the SEC. Thus, the court held that Co-
lello's due process rights had been violated and that the Swiss
Treaty's "reasonable suspicion" standard violated the Fourth
Amendment's requirement of due process.
72. See id. at 741.
73. See id. at 755.
74. See id. at 753.
75. See id. at 744 n.4.
76. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
77. Id. at 91.
78. Colello, 908 F. Supp. at 750-51.
79. See id. at 755.
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B. Analysis of Colello
1. Policy Considerations. By holding the Swiss Treaty to be
unconstitutional, both on its face and as applied, the court places in
grave danger virtually all of the mechanisms used by the SEC to
obtain assistance from foreign authorities in investigating and
enforcing securities law actions, as neither the Hague Convention,
nor the various MLATs and MOUs, contain "probable cause" or
"notice and hearing" requirements. These mechanisms have been
used to achieve a large number of results that are instinctively
considered to be just. Not only has international information-
gathering been greatly facilitated, but the existence of such
mechanisms may reduce the probability of international disputes
over just what information may or may not be released and what may
be done with it. In addition, these mechanisms have been used
successfully to restore funds to defrauded investors that might
otherwise never have seen their money again and to track down and
prosecute individuals who previously thought they could flout U.S.
securities laws and then, if the tables turned, hide their ill-gotten
gains outside of the country.' This author has been unable to locate
any case in which the SEC abused its power under these mechanisms,
either by freezing the assets of innocent parties, maintaining freezes
longer than necessary, misusing information obtained in accordance
with one of these mechanisms, or otherwise. Indeed, the outcome in
Colello suggests that the SEC may have been justified in maintaing
the freeze on Colello's account, as it was later held that there was no
question of material fact as to whether Colello had misappropriated
funds and defrauded his customers, and he was ordered to disgorge
all of his fraudulent proceeds.
This is not to suggest that the SEC should be granted free reign
to do as it pleases under the guise of action in accordance with a
treaty or memorandum of understanding, in disregard of constitu-
tional considerations. Though beyond the scope of this Note, ade-
quate remedies for any genuine wrongdoing or violation of constitu-
tional rights by the SEC can likely be found in domestic
administrative law without going to the extreme of declaring a treaty
80. See eg., SEC v. Antar, Litigation Rel. No. 12548 [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 95,341 (D. N.J. 1990); Trustee/Receier Recovers Canadian Assets of Eddie
Antar, SEC NEWs DIGEST 93-99, May 25, 1993. See also Establishment of International En-
forcement Mechanisms, supra note 16, at 311-12.
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unconstitutional.8' Furthermore, part of the Colello court's holding is
based on the lack of notice and hearing, which, though certainly a
question of due process, is a right which has a particular meaning in
the context of agency action." It seems, therefore, that an analysis of
the SEC's actions should begin with the jurisprudence of administra-
tive law; yet the court bypasses this step and moves directly into a
sweeping constitutional analysis.
Given the great importance of the SEC maintaining its ability to
use international enforcement mechanisms, and the highly negative
impact that the newfound unconstitutionality of virtually all such
agreements would have on this capability, courts in cases such as Co-
lello would be well-advised to apply the Constitution no more
broadly than necessary and to limit themselves to a more restrained
holding. It would be preferable to rebuke the SEC for not providing
notice and hearing, or for not obtaining a warrant, which would lead
to the institution of additional procedures by the SEC to ensure com-
pliance with these requirements, than to erase years of cooperation
and development with one broad stroke of the judicial pen by de-
claring an important and frequently-used treaty unconstitutional.
Rather than strike down an entire treaty, the appropriate remedy, if
any, should be found in a more restrictive application of constitu-
tional protections.
It is with this need for a more restrictive reading in mind that the
holding in Colello will now be analyzed.
2. The Extent of Constitutional Protection. The Colello court
emphasized the view that constitutional protection extends beyond
the boundaries of the United States when enforcement efforts by
U.S. actors are involved.' However, the court failed to specify why
the actions taken by the Swiss authorities constitute enforcement
efforts by U.S. actors. As a threshold matter, then, it must be
determined whether the asset freeze was such an enforcement effort.
The test used to determine whether a particular action abroad is
that of a U.S. actor was set out in Stonehill v. United States.84 In
Stonehill, the admissibility of certain evidence in a tax proceeding
81. For example, the problem could be resolved by simply finding that the SEC failed to
provide sufficient notice and opportunity for a hearing under the Administrative Procedures
Act, rather than declaring the use of the treaty itself to be unconstitutional.
82 See infra Part III.B.3.
83. 908 F. Supp. at 754, citing to Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957).
84. 405 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1968).
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was challenged, as the evidence had been gathered as the result of
government raids in the Philippines, which would have been uncon-
stitutional if performed in the United States. In affirming the district
court's order denying the motion to suppress, the Ninth Circuit set
forth the following test of whether action by a U.S. actor was present:
If the nature of the federal agent's involvement in the challenged
conduct was that of a joint venture, then the involvement would be
sufficient to raise constitutional concems.8' The Stonehill court then
considered the admissibility of information obtained by methods
which would run counter to the Fourth Amendment if performed in
the United States. The court held that this was a very fact-specific
inquiry," and compared cases in which a joint venture was held to
have existed with those in which no joint venture was found. Essen-
tially, the court concluded that, while merely giving information to
the foreign authorities which results in the release of information to
U.S. authorities does not constitute a joint venture,' such a joint ven-
ture does exist when the U.S. agent in question was physically present
and participated personally in the unlawful search, and may exist
when the U.S. agent directed that the action be taken.'
Though Colello neglects to engage in the determination of
whether an action by a U.S. actor is present, the court itself uses lan-
guage which would tend to distinguish this case from the cases in
which a joint venture was found to exist. The court goes to great
length to point out that the SEC and the Department of Justice in no
way "controll[ed]" the Swiss response, 9 and seems to suggest that
there is some doubt as to whether the Swiss Central Authority could
even be considered to be an agent of the SEC or the Department of
Justice.'o Nevertheless, despite the court's improvident choice of
words, it appears that a joint venture existed between the SEC and
the Department of Justice and the Swiss Authorities, thus subjecting
the validity of the asset freeze to constitutional scrutiny. First, the
SEC, though not physically present in Switzerland, directed that the
asset freeze take place; second, the existence of a joint venture is fur-
ther indicated by the fact that the Swiss had no stake in the matter;
85. See id. at 743.
86. See id. at 744.
87. See id. at 746.
88. See id. at 745.
89. 908 F. Supp. at 752.
90. See id. (stating that "even if there were some way that the Swiss Central Authority
might be said to be the 'agent' of the United States when responding to treaty requests, nothing
in the Treaty or diplomatic notes requires Switzerland to answer to the United States").
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and third, the freeze took place solely at the request of the SEC for
the benefit of the SEC. Furthermore, the spirit of international co-
operation in securities law enforcement, evidenced by the coopera-
tion between the Swiss and the SEC and the expectation of reciproc-
ity should the need arise, indicates a joint venture. It should be noted
that though the U.S. actors were not physically present in Switzer-
land, the asset freeze would not have taken place but for their treaty
request. This indicates that, under Stonehill, the Swiss action was a
joint venture by the Swiss with the SEC and Department of Justice,
and that therefore the Swiss action was subject to scrutiny under the
Fourth Amendment. However, as stated above, policy considera-
tions dictate that the procedure, if constitutionally infirm, should be
invalidated under administrative law jurisprudence rather than by
striking down the entire Treaty.
3. Notice and Hearing. The Colello court held that the failure by
the SEC and the Department of Justice to provide notice and
opportunity for a hearing to the plaintiffs was a violation of the Fifth
Amendment's guarantee of due process.91 This was held even though
the Swiss Central Authority gave notice of the freeze and Swiss
Federal Law provides that "[a]ny person affected by a legal
assistance proceeding and [having] an interest worthy of protection"
may file a written objection within ten days after the Central
Authority has announced the order. Whether or not notice and
opportunity for a hearing must be given by the U.S. party to the
treaty request, or whether such notice and hearing can be provided
for by the foreign party, has apparently never been litigated. The test
for whether agency notice and hearing provisions are sufficient is set
forth in Mathews v. Eldridge.? There, Justice Powell announced a
three-prong balancing test that considers the private interest that will
be affected by the official action, weighted by the risk of erroneous
deprivation through procedures used and the probable value of
additional procedural safeguards, balanced against the Government's
interest in the current procedures."
In Colello, the private interest is the temporary deprivation of
91. Had notice and hearing been given, the Fuentes test would presumably not have come
into play, as pre-deprivation notice and hearing would have made Fuentes moot in this case,
and adequate post-deprivation notice might have served as the requisite check on the SEC's
discretion.
92. 908 F. Supp. at746.
93. 424 U.S. 319,335 (1976).
94. Id.
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funds held in a foreign bank account. The Colello court agreed that
under Fuentes there is a need for immediate action95 and that the lack
of due process occurred only in not providing the plaintiffs with post-
deprivation notice and hearing by the SEC. It is difficult to see how
post-deprivation notice and hearing by the SEC, as compared to the
Swiss authorities, would have provided substantially different safe-
guards. Furthermore, the SEC had requested that the freeze be
maintained, even after having its request for a temporary restraining
order denied in federal court, and thus, its position was unlikely to
change in an agency hearing. Finally, the plaintiffs did learn of the
asset freeze from the Swiss authorities and had the opportunity to file
a protest to the freeze with the Swiss.
The low probable value of additional safeguards, combined with
the temporary nature of the asset freeze and the fact that this freeze
did not likely subject the plaintiff to any undue hardship, provides for
a low factor on the plaintiff's side of the Mathews balancing test. Fur-
96thermore, after Goss v. Lopez, written notice and opportunity to re-
spond to charges in writing is generally deemed sufficient to guaran-
tee due process. Thus, the opportunity provided by Swiss law
appears to fulfill the hearing requirement. On the other hand, the
relative ease with which the SEC could have provided Colello with
post-deprivation notice and a hearing also provides for a low factor
on the government interest side.
On balance, it appears that the procedures provided by Swiss law
provided sufficient due process to the plaintiffs. The risk remains,
however, that under similar MLATs the foreign country may not
provide sufficient due process. This concern should be addressed in
future SEC actions involving the use of international enforcement
agreements.
4. Seizure. Colello's analysis of the seizure' begins by
enunciating the principle that, if it is not to violate the Fourth
Amendment, any search or seizure must be reasonable.9' It further
reasons that any warrant must be based on probable cause," and that,
when proceeding without a warrant, a search or seizure must be
"reasonable," which has been equated with "probable cause.""
Since the Swiss Treaty provided for assistance based on a
"reasonable suspicion," '' which the Technical Analysis to the Treaty
expressly identifies as being a less stringent standard than probable
95. See 908 F. Supp. at 750.
96. 419 U.S. 565, 582 (1975).
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cause,' the court held that the constitutional standard had not been
met, and that the seizure was therefore a violation of the Fourth
Amendment."3
Though convincing as a matter of pure constitutional law, the
court's opinion fails to consider the SEC's status as a federal agency.
This federal administrative status allows the SEC to rely upon certain
exceptions to the warrant requirement in the context of a federal
search. Notably, the Supreme Court held, in New York v. Burger,
14
that where the business being searched is a "closely regulated busi-
ness," no warrant is necessary. 5 The Court has furthermore stated
that "[e]xcept in certain well-defined circumstances, a search or sei-
zure.., is not reasonable unless it is accomplished pursuant to a judi-
cial warrant issued upon probable cause."'0 6 These special circum-
stances include situations in which the warrant and probable cause
requirement is impractical.' When such special needs are present,
the Court is willing to balance the governmental and privacy interests
to assess the practicality of the warrant and probable cause require-
ment in the particular context."'
It appears, therefore, that seizures may be included in the excep-
tions to the warrant and probable cause requirement. Presumably,
therefore, a lower standard may be applied as well to seizures related
to closely-regulated businesses. If junkyards are a closely-regulated
business, so then must be the securities industry, whose every facet is
regulated by the federal securities laws. Since the asset freeze was a.
seizure related to the securities industry, the "closely regulated busi-
ness" rule could arguably apply.
One problem with such an analysis, however, is that the seizure
itself is not taking place in a business that is closely regulated by the
SEC. Rather, it is taking place in the rather private and discrete
97. Both the SEC and the Department of Justice conceded that the asset freeze was a sei-
zure. See 908 F. Supp. at 752-53.
98. See id. at 753.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. Swiss Treaty, supra note 14, art. 1(2).
102. See 908 F. Supp. at 753.
103. See id. at 755.
104. 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
105. Id. at 702.
106. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989) (emphasis
added).
107. See id.
108. See id.
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world of Swiss banking. Given the fairly strict limitations to the
"closely regulated business" rule and the inquiry into congressional
intent set out in Marshall v. Barlow's,'9 use of this exception to the
warrant and probable requirement will likely prove untenable, not
only because the location of the seizure does not fall squarely within
the rubric of a "closely regulated business," but also because the lack
of enabling legislation related to the treaty indicates no congressional
intent to permit this type of seizure.
A more promising analysis would balance the SEC's interest in
being able to rapidly freeze assets located abroad as well as meeting
the probable cause and warrant requirements at an early stage of the
investigation against the plaintiffs' interest in having access to their
assets. The SEC has a significant interest in the rapid freeze of for-
eign-located assets of persons suspected of securities law violations.
Through quick action it can prevent the dissipation of those assets
once their owner is alerted to the proceedings against him. Further-
more, the SEC may not have sufficient evidence to fully establish
probable cause until its investigation is well under way. By that
point, the assets may no longer be easily identifiable or traceable, as
the suspected offender will likely have realized that he is under inves-
tigation and may have taken steps to further dissipate those assets.
Coupled with the potential difficulties and delays in issuing an inter-
nationally valid warrant, the balance seems to tip strongly in favor of
the SEC. This rings particularly true in light of the fact that Colello
was probably not subjected to undue hardship by the asset freeze, as
he likely possessed considerable assets outside of Switzerland."'
Whatever the ultimate outcome in Colello on appeal, the mes-
sage is clear: Courts are willing to examine the constitutionality of
procedures used by the SEC to obtain information and freeze assets
abroad, and care should be taken to ensure that future actions com-
ply with constitutional requirements in order to avoid results of the
kind seen in Colello.
C. Other Constitutional Issues
Assuming the existence of a joint venture under Stonehill, sev-
eral other constitutional questions are raised by the use of MOUs
and MLATs. These include:
109. 436 U.S. 307,311 (1978).
110. This is indicated by the fact that Colello had assets in the United States that were suffi-
ciently large to justify the SEC's attempt to freeze them in addition to freezing his assets in
Switzerland. Colello, 908 F. Supp. at 740.
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2) Does a person questioned [abroad under an MOU or MLAT]
have the right to raise under the United States Constitution various
rights and privileges such as the Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel or the
Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures?
4) What role does the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination play in the procedures outlined in the MOU?
b) What if the [foreign] authority is responsible for the taking of
testimony. Are the United States constitutional protections of pro-
cedural and substantive due process available to the deponent? If
not, should the deponent be allowed to raise the absence of these
protections in seeking to exclude his testimony in subsequent pro-
ceedings brought in the United States?n.
In a similar vein, Senator Jesse Helms (R-N.C.), in debating the
ratification of several MLATs in 1988, voiced concerns that, among
other things,
4) MLATs do not provide for cross-examination of witnesses in the
authentication of documents, as required by the 6th Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution.
5) The MLATs do not provide for safe conduct to potential wit-
nesses. As a result, the governments rely upon depositions rather
than the appearance of witnesses at trial, which is guaranteed by
the bill of rights
7) The U.S. Government is not required to demonstrate probable
cause to obtain documents under the treaties from a government
thereby violating the 4th Amendment of the Constitution .... 2
Because of the debate over these and other issues, the ratifica-
tion of the MLATs was significantly delayed."3 Yet, these questions
demonstrate clearly some of the problems that need to be resolved
and indicate the sort of constitutional challenges that are likely to be
made regarding the SEC's use of MLATs and MOUs.
111. Theodore Sonde & Teresa A. Scott, Constitutional and Procedural Questions Raised
by the Canadian Memorandum of Understanding and Other Facets of the SEC's International
Enforcement Efforts, C475 ALI-ABA 261, 277-79 (1989).
112. Bruce Zagaris, Developments in International Judicial Assistance and Related Matters,
18 DENv. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 339,356 (1990).
113. Id. at 357.
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IV. RECENT AGREEMENTS
In addition to the "new breed" of MOUs discussed above, nu-
merous MLATs have been entered into by the United States over the
last few years that indicate a broadening of international cooperation
in investigating and prosecuting violations of law, including SEC in-
vestigations of violations of Unites States securities laws. These new
MLATs, currently awaiting Senate ratification, address some of the
problems associated with MLATs and MOUs, reflect the increased
possibilities under ITSFEA and ISECA,"' and include many of the
voluntary provisions previously found in MOUs, now in the binding
form of a treaty. The highly similar recent MLATs with Korea,"'
Hungary,"6 and Austria 7 are representative of the general form that
recent MLATs have taken. Their principle features and remaining
problems are described below.
A. Constitutional Concerns
1. Searches and Seizures. Article I of all three treaties contains a
non-exclusive list of the types of assistance to be provided under the
treaty, including the execution of requests for searches and seizures,
as well as assistance in forfeiture proceedings, expressly including
asset freezes in the Austrian and Hungarian MLATs."' This
eliminates the problem posed in Colello where the lack of a specific
provision in the Swiss Treaty authorizing asset freezes allowed
Colello to attack the action on technical grounds. However, Article
15 of the three treaties requires the requested state to execute search-
and-seizure requests only if the request includes information
justifying such a request under the laws of the requested state.1 9
Under Reid,' if it can be shown that the SEC is acting in concert
with a foreign regulator, as was found in Colello, this standard based
114. See text accompanying notes 43-59, supra.
115. Treaty with the Republic of Korea on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters,
Nov. 23,1993, U.S.-Kor., S. TREATY Doc. No. 104-1 (1995) [hereinafter Korean MLAT].
116. Treaty with Hungary on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Dec. 1, 1994,
U.S.-Hung., S. TREATY Doc. No. 104-20 (1995) [hereinafter Hungarian MLAT].
117. Treaty With Austria on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Feb. 23, 1995,
U.S.-Aus., S. TREATY Doc. No. 104-21 (1995) [hereinafter Austrian MLAT].
118. See Korean MLAT, supra note 115, art. 1, at 2; Hungarian MLAT, supra note 116, art.
1, at 2; Austrian MLAT, supra note 117, art. 1, at 2.
119. See Korean MLAT, supra note 115, art. 15, at 14; Hungarian MLAT, supra note 116,
art. 15, at 16; Austrian MLAT, supra note 117, art. 15, at 18.
120. 354 U.S. 1 (1985); see further discussion of Colello, supra Part III.
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on the laws of the requested state may be insufficient, as the
requested state's laws do not necessarily provide the same
constitutional safeguards present in the United States.
2. Probable Cause. The three treaties do not adequately address
the concerns enunciated in Colello about using a standard of proof
other than probable cause. The Austrian treaty employs the same
"reasonable suspicion" standard121 that was challenged in Colello,l"
while the Hungarian and Korean treaties make no mention of the
standard of proof required to be met in making a request. Though
Article 15 of all three treaties provides that a request for a search and
seizure must be accompanied by information justifying the action
under the laws of the requested state,n this standard may not meet
constitutional muster.
3. Due Process. None of the three treaties has a notice or
hearing requirement in connection with asset freezes. In this regard,
these new MLATs are no less problematic than the Swiss MLAT in
Colelloy4
4. Right to Counsel. Under Article 8 of the treaties, the
requested state must allow the presence of persons specified in the
request during the execution of the request, and must allow those
persons to cross-examine persons giving testimony in connection with
the request."v These specified persons may include the accused,
counsel for the accused, or other interested persons. 6 Though the
requesting state must ask for the presence of these persons, the SEC
could use this provision to avoid Sixth Amendment challenges by
providing in its requests that the accused must be entitled to have
counsel present at the time testimony or evidence is taken.
121. It is interesting to note that in the border-search context, reasonable suspicion is the
established standard for initiating a non-routine search. United States v. Montoya de Her-
nandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985) ("'reasonable suspicion' standard effects a needed balance be-
tween private and public interests when law enforcement officials must make a limited intru-
sion on less than probable cause"). By suggesting that probable cause is the required standard
in any search and seizure case, Colello appears to be in direct conflict with clear Supreme Court
precedent. 908 F. Supp. at 753.
122. See Austrian MLAT, supra note 117, art. 1, at 3.
123. See id. art. 15, at 18; Hungarian MLAT, supra note 116, art. 15, at 16; Korean MLAT,
supra note 115, art. 15, at 14-15.
124. See discussion in text accompanying notes 75-78 and 88-93, supra.
125. See Korean MLAT, supra note 115, art. 8, at 9-10; Hungarian MLAT, supra note 116,
art. 8, at 10; Austrian MLAT, supra note 117, art. 8, at 11-12.
126. See, e.g., Letter of Submittal, Austrian MLAT, supra note 117, at iii.
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B. Other Concerns
1. Dual Criminality. Under Article 1 of the Austrian and
Hungarian treaties, no dual criminality is required.1 Under the
Korean treaty, the requested state has the discretion to deny
assistance if the conduct being investigated would not be an offense
under the law of the requested state. However, this basis for denial
may not be used if the conduct falls under one of twenty-three
categories of serious crimes annexed to the treaty,1" which
specifically include fraudulent securities practices and insider
trading.129 Thus, the SEC will be able to issue binding requests for
information and enforcement assistance where it could previously
only request voluntary action under an MOU.
2. Scope of Assistance. Requests under the Korean and
Hungarian treaties are not limited to criminal matters; they may be
for any form of assistance not prohibited by the laws of the requested
state.'O Under the Austrian treaty, the scope of the treaty includes,
in addition to criminal offenses, forfeiture proceedings."' As a result
of these provisions and the enabling legislation of ITSFEA, 3 2 the
SEC, through the Department of Justice, will be able to request a
broad range of information for civil actions, even in the absence of
concurrent criminal proceedings.
3. Confidentiality. Article 5 of all three treaties provides that if
asked, the requested state must use its "best efforts" to keep requests
and their contents confidential, 33 and Article 7 of all three treaties
requires that the requesting state keep information or evidence
furnished by the requested state confidential if so asked by the
requested state.' Article 9 of the three treaties provides that the
requested party may provide the requesting party with information
that is not publicly available, to the extent that it would be available
127. See Austrian MLAT, supra note 117, art. 1, at 3; Hungarian MLAT, supra note 116,
art. 1,at 2.
128. See Korean MLAT, supra note 115, art. 1, at 3.
129. See id. annex paras. 7, 8.
130. See id. art. 1, at 3; Hungarian MLAT, supra note 116, art. 1, at 2.
131. Austrian MLAT, supra note 117, art. 1, at 2.
132. ITSFEA, supra note 46.
133. See Korean MLAT, supra note 115, art. 5, at 7; Hungarian MLAT, supra note 116, art.
5, at 8; Austrian MLAT, supra note 117, art. 5, at 9.
134. See Korean MLAT, supra note 115, art. 7, at 9; Hungarian MLAT, supra note 116, art.
7, at 9, Austrian MLAT, supra note 117, art. 7, at 10.
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to the requested party's own law enforcement authorities.1 35 These
three provisions reflect the impact of ISECA's two FOIA provisions:
the SEC may withhold information provided by foreign authorities
under a treaty request, even if such information would normally be
subject to disclosure under FOIA,'3 and the SEC can provide foreign
regulators with information that is normally exempt from disclosure
under FOIA
4. Cost Sharing. Article 6 of the three treaties provides that costs
incurred in granting a request shall be apportioned between the
states, with the requested state bearing costs within its own territory,
except for expert witness fees, translation and transcription costs, and
certain travel expenses, which are to be paid for by the requesting
state.13 1 ISECA's explicit approval of requests by the SEC to foreign
securities authorities for reimbursement for expenses incurred in
carrying out requests" will allow the SEC to take full advantage of
this provision.
C. Summary and Analysis
The three treaties described above make significant progress in
clarifying and expanding the use of the mutual assistance mechanism.
For example, dual criminality is no longer an obstacle to requests be-
tween the signatory states, the scope of assistance that can be re-
quested is far broader than that contemplated by earlier treaties, and
new confidentiality and cost-sharing provisions should encourage co-
operation between countries by removing two major concerns that
existed under earlier treaties. Unfortunately, these new treaties do
not adequately address the constitutional concerns raised by Colello
and elsewhere.
V. FUTURE STEPS
As the SEC enters the twenty-first century, it is confronted with
an international securities market that is growing at a frenetic pace.
Though this growth needs to be encouraged, concurrent efforts
135. See Korean MLAT, supra note 115, art. 9, at 10-11; Hungarian MLAT, supra note 116,
art. 9, at 12, Austrian MLAT, supra note 117, art. 9, at 13.
136. ISECA, supra note 47, § 78x(d).
137. Id.
138. See Korean MLAT, supra note 115, art. 6, at 8; Hungarian MLAT, supra note 116, art.
6, at 9; Austrian MLAT, supra note 117, art. 6, at 9-10.
139. ISECA, supra note 47, § 78d.
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should be made to preserve the integrity of the U.S. market and the
protection of U.S. investors. Part of the means of accomplishing this
goal is the increased use of international agreements to cooperate
with foreign securities regulators both in information-gathering and
in enforcement. However, the SEC must keep its eye on the poten-
tial pitfalls of such international agreements and avoid stumbling
over constitutional hurdles as it did in Colello.
As seen above, the new breed of MLATs addresses many of the
problems with previous MLATs and MOUs. However, several issues
remain. In order to avoid repeated problems of the sort seen in Co-
lello, the SEC should go beyond the letter of the law of the treaties
and MOUs and adopt internal procedures specifically aimed at ful-
filling the requirements of the Constitution. Problem areas include
the issues of probable cause for searches and seizures, the due proc-
ess concerns of notice and hearing, and the right to representation of
counsel and cross-examination. The SEC should ensure that all re-
quests made under the various international agreements clearly iden-
tify behavior by the person(s) being investigated that meets the prob-
able cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment1 4 The SEC
should provide notice and a hearing to a person whose assets are to
be frozen pursuant to a request under one of these agreements to re-
duce the risk of due process violations. As noted in Colello, this does
not necessarily require notice and a hearing prior to the asset freeze
if there is a special need for rapid action, so long as prompt post-
deprivation notice is given. Likewise, the SEC should include with
every assistance request instructions that the person being investi-
gated be permitted to have counsel present whenever that person is
being questioned, as well as for cross-examination of other witnesses
being deposed.
VI. CONCLUSION
The growth of the international securities market has been ac-
companied by a large array of international agreements to police that
market. Though well-intentioned, most of these agreements resem-
ble the Swiss Treaty that was held unconstitutional in Colello. The
new legislation that permits a broadening of the scope of these
140. This requirement should not pose undue difficulties on the SEC, and may often be a
question of properly wording the request. This is particularly true in light of the trend towards
lowering the requirements for probable cause in administrative proceedings. See Marshall v.
Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978) (holding that probable cause may be based on showing that
reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an inspection are satisfied).
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agreements does little to address these concerns. In the future, it is
critical that the SEC in entering into MOUs, and the United States in
entering into MLATs, pay particular attention to these issues to en-
sure that future agreements comply with the protections guaranteed
under the U.S. Constitution. Furthermore, the SEC should institute
procedures that provide persons being investigated under interna-
tional agreements with the same rights and remedies that they would
have under a purely domestic investigation. By so doing, the SEC
can avoid further unfortunate results.
Elliott M. Beard

